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Abstract
Background: The reduction of perioperative harm is a major priority of in-hospital health care and the reporting
of incidents and their causes is an important source of information to improve perioperative patient safety. We
explored the number, nature and causes of voluntarily reported perioperative incidents in order to highlight the
areas where further efforts are required to improve patient safety.
Methods: Data from the Hospital Incident Management System (HIMS), entered in the period from July 2009
to July 2012, were analyzed in a Dutch university hospital. Employees in the perioperatve field filled out a
semi-structured digital form of the reporting system. The risk classification of the reported adverse events and ‘near
misses’ was based on the estimated patient consequences and the risk of recurrence, according to national guidelines.
Predefined reported incident causes were categorized as human, organizational, technical and patient related.
Results: In total, 2,563 incidents (1,300 adverse events and 1,263 ‘near-miss’ events) were reported during 67,360
operations. Reporters were anesthesia, operating room and recovery nurses (37%), ward nurses (31%), physicians (17%),
administrative personnel (5%), others (6%) and unmentioned (3%). A total of 414 (16%) adverse events had patient
consequences (which affected 0,6% of all surgery patients), estimated as catastrophic in 2, very serious in 34, serious in
105, and marginally serious in 273 cases. Shortcomings in communication was the most frequent reported type of
incidents. Non-compliance with Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs: instructions, regulations, protocols and
guidelines) was reported with 877 (34%) of incident reports. In total, 1,194 (27%) voluntarily reported causes were
SOP-related, mainly human-based (79%) and partially organization-based (21%). SOP-related incidents were not
associated with more patient consequences than other voluntarily reported incidents. Furthermore ‘mistake or
forgotten’ (15%) and ‘communication problems’ (11%) were frequently reported causes of incidents.
Conclusions: The analysis of voluntarily reported perioperative incidents identified an association between
perioperative patient safety problems and human failure, such as SOP non-compliance, mistakes, forgetting, and
shortcomings in communication. The data suggest that professionals themselves indicate that SOP compliance in
combination with other human failures provide room for improvement.
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Background
Patient safety is a global public health issue receiving
rapidly increasing attention. Patient safety is the (near)
absence of (the chance of ) avoidable harm inflicted on
the patient through the actions and/or negligence of
employees or through flaws in the healthcare system [1].
Numerous medical record studies have shown that un-
safe care may result in adverse events (AEs) leading to
harm in 3-17% of hospital patients [2]. An AE is “an un-
intended injury or complication resulting in prolonged
length of hospital stay, disability at the time of discharge
or death caused by health care management and not by
the patients’ underlying disease” [3]. A total of 51-77%
of AEs in hospitals are related to perioperative care [2].
A systematic review reveals that 14% of perioperative
patients experience some form of AEs, that 38% of these
AEs are preventable and that 4% of patients experiencing
AEs have fatal outcomes [4]. Preventable AEs are the
result of care that falls below current professional stan-
dards and the expected performance of practitioners or
care systems [1,2].
To improve patient safety and reduce adverse events, a
national safety management system has been implemen-
ted in Dutch hospitals (‘Veiligheidsmanagementsysteem =
VMS’) between 2008–2012. VMS focuses on the manage-
ment of risks (the prevention of patient harm and its pos-
sible consequences) and is described in the ‘Netherlands
Technical Agreement’ (NTA) [5]. The starting point for
this NTA was the report “Here you’ll work safely, or you
won’t work here” [6]. VMS consists of systems for risk
identification, risk analysis, risk evaluation, incident re-
porting, incident analysis, and managing recommenda-
tions and improvement measures.
The operating department (including the clinical oper-
ating and recovery rooms) of the Radboud university
medical center introduced the Hospital Incident Man-
agement System (HIMS) in July 2009. HIMS aimed at
facilitating the voluntarily and confidentially reporting
of perioperative incidents. After using HIMS for three
years, we set out to analyze whether there are specific
types or patterns of the reported information and to
detect the areas where further efforts are required to
improve perioperative patient safety. Specifically, we
wished to investigate the number and characteristics
of the voluntarily reported perioperative incidents. From
the start of recording we noticed that Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) non-compliance was a prominent repor-
ted cause of incidents.
Since humans are fallible, systems must be designed to
prevent humans from making errors [7,8]. Standardisation,
the use of guidelines and protocols, is generally considered
to improve perioperative safety. Preventable patient harm
may be the result of guideline non-compliance but unfor-
tunately there is hardly any literature about this problem in
perioperative care. Dutch hospital record review studies
suggest that at least 10-15% of AEs are directly or indir-
ectly related to procedure non-compliance [9,10]. The
compliance rate of the use of surgical safety checklists
ranges from 12% to 100% (mean 75%) [11]. French re-
search revealed that alarms are frequently ignored by the
operating theatre staff [12]. English anesthesiologists wit-
nessed that 22% of incidents during anaesthesia are related
to protocol violations [13].
There is an association between undesirable periopera-
tive events and subsequent critical perioperative outcomes
[14]. Recent studies reveal also that better guideline com-
pliance is associated with better perioperative outcomes
[15,16]. Therefore, adherence to guidelines is an important
target for safety improvement programs. This study was
designed to provide data on the number, nature and
causes of voluntarily reported perioperative incidents.
Methods
This retrospective study is performed in the Radboud
university medical center, which has 953 beds and 25
operating rooms (ORs). All data were obtained from
HIMS, a database that is developed by the Patient Safety
Company (http://www.patientsafety.com), licensed to the
Radboud university medical center and used by the
operating department since July 2009. The study period
lasted from the 1st of July 2009 to the 1st of July 2012.
Incidents in HIMS are reported as a) ‘adverse events’, i.e.
any unintended or unexpected event which could have
led or did lead to harm of one or more patients receiving
hospital care and b) ‘near-miss events’, i.e. events or cir-
cumstances that nearly occurred but were prevented
(through luck or intervention) and did not lead to patient
harm. [1] Harm is defined as any injury to the patient
which leads to an extension or increase in the treatment,
to temporary or permanent physical, psychological and/or
social functional loss, or to death [5]. The worsening of a
patient’s condition as a result of the natural progression of
an disease is not considered ‘harm’ [5].
At the introduction of HIMS, hospital wide appoint-
ments were made for reporting of incidents, based on
the national agreements [5]. All employees, including
professionals working in the perioperative process were
encouraged to report incidents in order to prevent them
from happening again. They were requested to fill out a
semi-structured digital form of the reporting system. At
least the following had to be reported: date, time and
location of the incident, a brief description of the event
and the circumstances, the type of incident and possible
causes, the potential patient impact and the estimated
risk of recurrence of that incident, and the measures that
may prevent the incident from repeating. The predefined
categorization of incident types is illustrated in Figure 1.
In Tables 1 and 2 an explanation of the used terms is
Heideveld-Chevalking et al. Patient Safety in Surgery  (2014) 8:46 Page 2 of 10
given, in particular of the concepts estimated risk of
recurrence (Table 1) and estimated consequences for the
patient (Table 2). This categorization of patient conse-
quences is based on national guidelines as described in
the NTA [5]. Based on the estimated patient consequen-
ces and risk of recurrence, the incident is automatically
classified into four risk categories (Table 3). This risk
classification is the basis for actions to be taken by the
Operating Room Incident Reporting Committee (ORIRC)
as described in Table 4. According to the Dutch con-
sensus classification reported incident causes were classi-
fied as human, organizational, technical, patient related
and other [1,2].
The ORIRC consists of a surgeon, two anesthesiologists,
a patient safety coordinator, a recovery room nurse, two
operating room nurses, an anesthesia nurse, a logistic man-
ager, a logistic employee, and a technician. The ORIRC
reviews and discusses incidents weekly with priority to
high risk events. Estimating the risk of recurrence and
potential consequences for the patient at the time of
reporting and before analysis of the incident may be diffi-
cult. Therefore, the ORIRC may adapt the risk score after
analysis of the incident. Subsequently, the ORIRC under-
takes actions, such as gathering additional information,
cross-checking with the medical charts, and exploring key
contributing factors through informal discussions with care
providers, managers, and/or other expert(s), asking ‘why’
and ‘what’ influenced the occurrence of this (near)incident.
Besides these analyzing actions, other activities of ORIRC
are trend watching, advising to adjust products and proce-
dures, providing feedback and spreading newsletters and
safety alerts to all involved in perioperative care. After clos-
ing a report, all information is automatically anonymized.
The information in HIMS is not used for blaming, shaming
or (legal) actions against the reporting professional, but for
improving the quality of patient care.
Descriptive statistics were used to describe the number,
nature and causes of incidents. Chi-square tests with
Yates’ correction and odds ratios (ORs) with 95% confi-
dence limits (CL) were applied to test differences between
physicians and non-physicians and between perioperative
and hospital wide reporting behaviour. A p-value < 0.05 is
considered to show statistical significance.
698
585
460
346
282
192
Communication
Equipment
Treatment
Other
Medication & blood products
Diagnostics
Type of Incidents (n=2,563)
Figure 1 Predefined types of voluntarily reported perioperative incidents.
Table 1 Explanation of risk of recurrence
Classification of the estimated risk of recurrence:
Almost inevitable It will probably happen again within a few
hours or days
Probable It will probably happen again within a week
Possible It will probably happen again within a few weeks
Small It will probably happen again within a few month
Very small It will not happen more than once a year
The estimated risk of recurrence of the reported incidents.
Table 2 Explanation of patient consequences
Classification of patient consequences:
Catastrophe (Expected) death or (expected) severe permanent harm
Very serious (Expected) permanent harm/major intervention like (re)
operation and/or (expected) extended hospitalization
or treatment > 7 days/delay of treatment causing
severe risk of harm
Serious (Expected) temporary harm and/or severe pain, for
which medical treatment is needed and/or (expected)
extended hospitalization or treatment > 3 days/delay
of treatment causing risk of harm
Marginally
serious
(Expected) minimal harm and/or pain, requiring minor
treatment and/or (expected) extended hospitalization
or treatment < 3 days/delay of treatment causing
minimal risk of harm
None No harm and no delay, or (expected) delay of
treatment causing no harm
The estimated potential patient consequences of the reported incidents.
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Results
Hospital-wide voluntarily reported incidents
Hospital-wide key figures over the period July 2009-July
2012 are presented in Table 5. The occurrence of volun-
tarily reported incidents associated with procedure non-
compliance within the operating department was not
significantly different from hospital wide reporting of
non-compliance with SOPs (34% and 32,5% respectively
(OR 1.087; 95% CL 0.998-1.184, p = 0.084)).
Characteristics of the voluntarily reported perioperative
incidents
Perioperatively 2,563 incidents were voluntarily reported
in HIMS: 1,300 adverse events and 1,263 ‘near-miss’
events. The reporters were all professionals involved in
perioperative patient care: anesthesia, operating room
and recovery nurses (37%), ward nurses (31%), physi-
cians (17%), administrative personnel (5%), and others
(6%). Of 85 (3%) incidents the appointment of the re-
porter was not mentioned. Figure 1 provides an over-
view of the types of incidents; communication failures
(27%) and equipment failures (23%) were the most fre-
quently reported type of voluntarily reported periopera-
tive incidents.
Patient consequences and risk of recurrence of reported
perioperative incidents
HIMS characterized 1,822 (71%) incidents as ‘medium
risk incidents’ which is shown in Table 6. Table 7 pre-
sents a specification of the estimated patient conse-
quences and risk of recurrence of incidents. Patient
consequences were estimated to have been inflicted 414
(32%) of 1,300 adverse events: 273 events were consid-
ered to have caused minimal patient harm and/or pain,
105 temporary patient harm and/or severe pain, and 34
permanent patient harm and/or needing major intervention
Table 3 Explanation of risk matrix
Patient
consequences
Catastrophe Extreme Extreme Extreme Extreme Extreme
Very serious High High High High High
Serious High High High Medium Medium
Marginally serious High High Medium Medium Low
None Medium Medium Medium Low Low
Risk of
recurrence
Almost
Inevitable
Probable Possible Small Very small
Risk matrix based on the estimated patient consequences and the estimated
risk of recurrence of the incident.
Table 4 Explanation of reporting requirments based on
the classified risk
Extreme risk
incident
The reporter/ORIRC contacts the involved head of
the department and checks whether the catastrophe
is handled according to the standard procedures,
meaning that the Board of Hospital Directors reports
the catastrophe to the Health Care Inspectorate.
High risk incident The ORIRC gathers further information, analyzes
the incident, discusses the incident in a meeting,
formulates conclusions and/or improvement actions.
Medium risk
incident
The ORIRC gathers further information, discusses
the incident in a meeting, formulates conclusions
and/or improvement actions.
Low risk incident The ORIRC formulates conclusions and/or
improvement actions.
ORIRC = Operating Room Incident Reporting Committee.
Reporting requirements based on the classified risk.
Table 5 Hospital-wide key figures, July 2009-July 2012
Total number of admissions 210,507
Total number of clinical operations 67,360
Total number of voluntarily reported incidents: 27,008
by physicians 2,937
by non-physicians 23,154
by reporters that did not mention their position 917
Number of voluntarily reported incidents per type:
medication & blood-related 6,932
communication-related 6,053
diagnostics-related 4,183
treatment-related 3,751
equipment-related 2,421
other type-related 3,668
Total number of voluntarily reported causes
(median 1; range 0–10 causes per incident)
48,055
Number of causes per category:
mistake/forgotten 9,611
SOP not followed 6,535
other 31, 909
Total number of SOP-related causes: 10,543
SOP not followed 6,535
SOP not known 2,116
SOP not available, incomplete or unclear 1,684
SOP not accessible 208
Number of incidents with SOP cause 8,789
Table 6 Risk classification of the 2,563 voluntarily
reported perioperative incidents
Risk Total incidents
n %
Extreme risk 3 (0.1%)
High risk 349 (13.6%)
Medium risk 1822 (71.1%)
Low risk 389 (15.2%)
Total 2563
Risk classification of the 2,563 voluntarily reported perioperative incidents.
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like (re)operation and/or extended hospitalization or treat-
ment. Two catastrophic adverse events, with one mortal-
ity, were reported to both the hospital board and the
Dutch Health Care Inspectorate. The risk of recurrence of
the previously mentioned 414 adverse events was esti-
mated as follows: possible recurrence within a day (n = 30),
within a week (n = 71), within a few weeks (n = 220),
within a few months (n = 70), and of 23 adverse events
it was estimated that the event would occur not more
frequently than once a year.
The estimated patient consequences and risk of recur-
rence of reported perioperative ‘near-miss’ events are
presented in Table 8. In total 233 (18%) of these 1263
‘near-misses’ were estimated as potentially harmful, which
was classified as marginally serious in 107 near-incidents,
serious in 81, and very serious in 44. One potential cata-
strophic ‘near-miss’ event concerned mechanical problems
with a part of the operating table and is described as an
example in Table 9.
A total of 2,149 (84%) of the voluntarily reported peri-
operative incidents were considered to have caused no pa-
tient harm, or delay of treatment which caused no harm, as
shown in the Tables 7 and 8. The risk of recurrence in 381
of these 2,149 incidents were estimated to reoccur within a
day, 505 within a week, 861 within a few weeks, 296 within
a few months, and of 106 incidents it was estimated that
the event would occur no more than once a year.
Reported causes
Table 10 shows the reported predefined causes of peri-
operative incidents and their classification. A total of 4,346
causes were reported (median 1, range 0–10 per incident).
In total 2,966 (68%) incident causes were related to human
factors, 1,004 (23%) to organizational factors, 89 (2%) to
technical failure, 128 (3%) were patient-related and 159
(4%) were related to other factors. Most frequently repor-
ted causes were SOP not followed (16,2%), human mistake
or having forgotten (15,4%) and communication problems
(11,5%). In total 1194 (27,5%) SOP related causes were
noted, as summarized in Table 10 part b.
Reported causes of procedure non-compliance
A more detailed analysis of the 1,194 SOP related causes
showed that 79% was related to human failure: a SOP
was known but not followed in 702 cases and not known
in 245 cases. Organization related factors were: unavail-
able, inaccessible, incomplete and unclear SOPs in 247
(21%) of cases. Procedure non-compliance was reported
with 877 (34%) of incidents; 648 SOP causes were repor-
ted with 471 adverse events, and 546 with 406 ‘near-
miss’events.
Table 11 summarize the patient consequences and risk
of recurrence of SOP associated perioperative incidents.
In 151 of the 877 SOP related incidents, the events were
associated with patient harm, while 263 of 1,686 non
Table 7 Estimated patient consequences and risk of recurrence of the 1,300 voluntarily reported perioperative adverse
events
Estimated patient consequences Total
Catastrophe 0 0 0 1 1 2
Very serious 4 6 16 7 1 34
Serious 4 18 58 18 7 105
Marginally serious 22 47 146 44 14 273
None 134 228 335 138 51 886
Total 164 299 555 208 74 1300
Estimated risk of recurrence Almost inevitable Probable Possible Small Negligible
Estimated patient consequences and risk of recurrence of the 1,300 voluntarily reported perioperative adverse events.
Table 8 Estimated potential patient consequences and risk of recurrence of the 1,263 voluntarily reported perioperative
‘near-miss’ events
Patient consequences could have been Total
Catastrophe 0 0 1 0 0 1
Very serious 10 7 15 6 6 44
Serious 13 37 27 3 1 81
Marginally serious 19 26 49 11 2 107
None 205 207 434 138 46 1030
Total 247 277 526 158 55 1263
Estimated risk of recurrence Almost inevitable Probable Possible Small Negligible
Estimated potential patient consequences and risk of recurrence of the 1,263 voluntarily reported perioperative ‘near-miss’ events.
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SOP related incidents were associated with patient harm
(OR 1.13 (95% CL 0.90-1.40), p = 0.291).
Most SOP related causes (n = 992) were reported by
non-physicians, 170 by physicians and 32 by reporters
who did not mention their function in the organization.
Non-physicians reported less frequently SOP causes of
incidents than physicians (52% versus 68%, p < 0.0001),
but non-physicians reported more often SOP causes of
near-incidents (48% versus 32%, p < 0.0001). There was
no statistically significant difference between both groups
in reporting human or organization related factors of SOP
non-compliance. Both groups most frequently reported
SOP causes with incidents that were classified as medium
risk incidents.
To illustrate the characteristics of voluntarily reported
perioperative incidents, examples are described in Table 9.
Discussion
We studied the characteristics of voluntarily reported
perioperative incidents at our operating department in
the period July 2009-July 2012. Reported incidents inclu-
ded ‘near-miss’ events as they can be seen as ‘free lessons
to be learned’ [17]. Overall, 67,360 operations were per-
formed in the three-year study period and 2,563 peri-
operative incidents were voluntarily reported. Most (84%)
of these incidents were not considered as potentially
harmful for patients, but 16% were, which comprised 0.6%
of all surgery patients. SOP non-compliance, short-
comings in communication, and mistakes or just ‘having
forgotten’, appeared to be frequently reported incident
causes. About one third of the reported perioperative
incidents was associated with SOP non-compliance; 79%
of these SOP-related causes were related to human failure.
The SOP-related incidents were not associated with
more patient consequences than other incidents. It is
noteworthy that the percentage voluntarily reported
incidents associated with SOP non-compliance within the
operating department did not differ from the hospital-
wide incidence.
There is increasing information that better guideline
compliance is associated with improved perioperative
outcomes [15,16]. A study on the implementation of a
bundle of care to reduce postoperative surgical site in-
fections showed that increased bundle compliance from
10% to 60% was associated with a significant 36% reduc-
tion in infection rate [16]. Another study in a Dutch uni-
versity hospital on the effect of the use of a perioperative
safety checklist showed a significant 56% reduction of the
in-hospital 30-day mortality after surgery in patients with
completed checklists whereas the mortality rate remained
unchanged in patients with partially completed or non-
completed checklists [15]. The results of our study clearly
show that a thorough analysis of the barriers that hinder
adequate communication and compliance with SOPs is
essential to further improve perioperative safety [18-20].
Incident reporting and investigation was first used in
the 1940s to improve safety and performance of military
aviation [21] and some decades later incident reporting
Table 9 Examples of reported perioperative incidents in HIMS
Examples of reported perioperative incidents in HIMS
HIMS risk
classification
Description Event type Incident type Function of
reporter
Reported cause
Low risk Two patients did not have correct
marking signs although the surgeon had
signed the checklist.
Adverse event Communication Recovery nurse at the
holding of the OR
SOP not followed
Medium risk During surgery the following happened: Adverse event Other Anesthetic nurse - Other organization-related
problem, namely: “delay
because of shortage of staff”;- 30 minutes waiting because the
patient arrived too late in the OR;
- For this operation there was no
blood typing performed;
- Human error or forgotten.
- During the time out it appeared that
the right size implant was not available.
High risk Surgery was performed without recent
available imaging. During surgery, it
appeared that metastases were increased
in size necessitating adjustment of
the surgical procedure.
Adverse event Diagnostics Radiologist - SOP not known
- SOP not available/
incomplete/unclear
- Incorrect performance
Extreme risk The headrest of the surgical table suddenly
went loose, which could have caused the
head of the patient to bend downwards
uncontrollably but the head of the patient
was stabilized in time by the anesthesiologist.
‘Near-miss’
event
Equipment OR nurse - Broken material;
- Wrong design;
- Other human error, namely:
“part of the table not
correctly fixated”.
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was introduced in anesthesiology [22]. Meanwhile, inci-
dent reporting has become a widely recommended me-
thod to gather information about AEs in hospital care [18]
and several methods have been developed [13,23-25].
Much information about AEs in hospitals comes from the
retrospective study of medical records [2,4,26,27]. How-
ever, retrospective record review has the well-known
disadvantage that AEs may not have been identified or re-
ported because they were not recorded in the medical file.
These retrospective studies also rarely give information
about ‘near-miss’events. Patient’s information is also a reli-
able source for the identification of care-related AEs [28].
Monitoring the performance of professionals by trained
observers may provide the most reliable picture of peri-
operative practice [13,29]. However, these studies may un-
derreport the actual rate of AEs because the researchers
only observed during daytime of weekdays [29]. Smith at
al. witnessed that around 20% of the incidents reported
were the result of violation from existing protocols [13].
To further improve patient safety it is essential not
only to get insight into the number, type, risk and causes
of voluntarily reported incidents, but also to reach agree-
ment on definitions and reproducible ways of reporting
and scoring. The Netherlands Technical Agreement aims
to contribute to the uniformity of the safety management
system in hospitals and to create openness about patient
safety towards patients and public. In order to improve
the effectiveness of the national incident reporting system,
we suggest further standardization of incident reporting
data, specifically of the categorization of the types and
causes of reported incidents. This has the potential to pro-
vide us with a system to compare hospital performance
and to benchmark performance using a validated system.
The five basic elements essential for the successful
translation from incident reporting to learning are 1) an
open reporting culture allowing independent non-punitive
data input, 2) the opportunity to freely narrate one’s own
version of the event, 3) an analysis that turns the incident
report into a lesson, 4) adequate feedback [23], and 5) def-
initions clear enough to be used in other centres in order
to be able to compare hospital performances. Investigating
and analyzing incidents requires optimal engagement of
physicians to get insight into the root cause and preven-
tion of these events [23]. The use of a standardized frame-
work for analysis of events has been recommended and
introduced in several centers around the world including
our center [23,30]. A positive safety culture is associated
with increased willingness to report errors [31,32], with
increased compliance with SOPs [33] and with fewer AEs
[34]. Apparently professionals at our department felt
safe enough to report communication failures and non-
compliance with SOPs. They knew that the information
will not be used to blame or undertake actions against
the reporter and that after analysis of an incident the
Table 10 Causes of perioperative ‘near-misses’ and
adverse events
A: Reported causes (n =4,346) of the perioperative incidents (n=2,563)
HIMS predefined causes N %
Human
SOP not followed 702 16.2%
Mistake/forgotten 669 15.4%
Communication problem 498 11.5%
Other human acting, namely*) 449 10.3%
SOP not known 245 5.6%
Professional not capable for task 161 3.7%
Distracted 105 2.4%
Unqualified or incorrect performance 77 1.8%
Incorrect use 40 0.9%
Wrong record filing 20 0.5%
Total human 2,966 68.2%
Organizational
Other organizational, namely*) 315 7.2%
SOP not available, incomplete, or unclear 217 5.0%
Culture at workplace 114 2.6%
High workload 115 2.6%
Equipment/supply related, namely*) 67 1.5%
Inadequately trained professional 67 1.5%
Medical devices not available 62 1.4%
SOP not accessible 30 0.7%
Unclear instructions 17 0.4%
Total organizational 1,004 23.1%
Technical
Broken material 61 1.4%
Wrong design 28 0.6%
Total technical 89 2.0%
Patient-related
Other patient related, namely*) 91 2.1%
Patient condition 19 0.4%
Patient behaviour 18 0.4%
Total patient-related 128 2.9%
Other, namely*) 159 3.7%
Total 4,346 100%
B: Summary of SOP releated causes
SOP not followed 702 16.2%
SOP not known 245 5.6%
SOP not available, incomplete, or unclear 217 5.0%
SOP not accessible 30 0.7%
Total of SOP related causes 1,194 27,5%
*)Further described by the reporter in open text field.
SOP = Standard Operative Procedure, including instructions, regulations,
protocols, and guidelines.
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information was anonymized to be used for training
purposes and improving the quality of care, if deemed
useful for this purpose.
A major weakness of incident reporting in all studies
is under-reporting. Incident reporting may capture only
4% to 50% of AEs [25,27,32-38]. The reasons for not
reporting are numerous: clinical factors (e.g. emergency
scenario), time constraints, unfamiliarity with the sys-
tem, problems with the definitions of what constitutes a
reportable incident or near-incident, lack of a hospital
policy of ‘no disciplinary action’ on incident reporting,
lack of anonymity, lack of feedback and confusing aims
of the reporting system as such [13,18]. However, the
best policy to improve reporting behaviour is currently
unknown [39]. Unfortunately, because of the risk of
under-reporting, voluntary incident reporting is not a
reliable instrument to monitor performance in e.g. the
plan-do-study-act cycle. However, it may be used as
qualitative monitor to identify areas that require further
efforts to improve perioperative patient safety.
Strength and limitations of the study
We have used voluntarily reporting of incidents as an
important source of information and hypothesized that
this would make us capable to contribute to understand-
ing and identifying clues for improving perioperative
safety [23,40]. The present study highlights the areas
where further efforts are required to improve patient
safety. Because of the likelihood of under-reporting, our
dataset cannot be considered a reproduction of all actually
occurred incidents. A second point of attention is the
fact that a substantial part of perioperative care is
delivered outside the operating department. Therefore,
our results, collected in the operating department, do
not represent the full scope of perioperative incidents,
as an unknown proportion will have been reported to
other incident reporting committees within the hospital.
Finally, this single center study may only reflect the cul-
ture and customs of our hospital. Since non-compliance
with guidelines is a well-known phenomenon, our re-
sults are most likely not specific for our hospital. How-
ever, there is no information about the contribution of
non-compliance with SOPs as cause of perioperative
incidents in other hospitals.
Conclusions
Voluntarily incident reporting provide important and
detailed information about perioperative patient safety
problems. The most important finding of the present
study is that professionals themselves report non-
compliance with SOPs associated with human failure is an
important area for improvement. Furthermore shortcom-
ings in communication, mistakes, and forgetting were
identified as important targets for improvement to reduce
perioperative incidents in our hospital. This finding re-
quires acknowledgement of the risk of human attitude,
behaviour and failure. Moreover these findings challenge
for the development of tools to improve guideline adher-
ence and effective communication, in order to improve
perioperative patient safety.
Table 11 Patient consequences and risk of recurrence of SOP related incidents
A. Reported SOP-related perioperative adverse events and ‘near-miss’events (n = 877)
Estimated Patient consequences Total
Catastrophe 0 0 0 0 0 0
Very serious 6 2 4 6 1 19
Serious 6 12 39 4 0 61
Marginally serious 15 27 79 17 4 142
None 139 164 254 72 26 655
Total 166 205 376 99 31 877
Estimated risk of recurrence Almost inevitable Probable Possible Small Negligible
B. Reported SOP-related perioperative adverse events (n = 471)
Catastrophe 0 0 0 0 0 0
Very serious 1 1 4 3 1 10
Serious 2 9 25 3 0 39
Marginally serious 8 16 62 13 3 102
None 59 91 117 39 14 320
Total 70 117 208 58 18 471
Estimated risk of recurrence Almost inevitable Probable Possible Small Negligible
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